
<prologue>
I started a blog called “The Baby Boomer Generation’s Miscellaneous Blog”(Dankai-sedai no garakutatyou:団塊世代の我楽多(がらくた)帳) in July 2018, about a year before I fully retired. More than six years have passed since then, and the number of articles has increased considerably.
So, in order to make them accessible to people who don’t understand Japanese, I decided to translate my past articles into English and publish them.
It may sound a bit exaggerated, but I would like to make this my life’s work.
It should be noted that haiku and waka (Japanese short fixed form poems) are quite difficult to translate into English, so some parts are written in Japanese.
If you are interested in haiku or waka and would like to know more, please read introductory or specialized books on haiku or waka written in English.
I also write many articles about the Japanese language. I would be happy if these inspire more people to want to learn Japanese.
my blog’s URL:団塊世代の我楽多(がらくた)帳 | 団塊世代が雑学や面白い話を発信しています
my X’s URL:団塊世代の我楽多帳(@historia49) on X
(Reference) Original article in Japanese
・「歴史決議」で終身独裁体制固めをし、戦狼外交を続ける習近平への対応策は?
1. Adoption of a “Historical Resolution” Positioning Xi Jinping as a Leader of a New Era, Successor to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping
On November 11, 2021, the state-run Xinhua News Agency reported that a new “historical resolution,” the first in 40 years, was adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (6th Plenum), a crucial meeting of the party.
The resolution positions General Secretary Xi Jinping (President) as a leader of a “new era,” succeeding the eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, and marks the final stage in the process of Xi’s long-term rule.
According to Xinhua, the adopted resolution is titled “Resolution on the Significant Achievements and Historical Experiences of the Party’s Centennial Struggle,” and Xi himself explained the draft on November 8, the opening day of the 6th Plenum. While the full text has not been released, it highly praises the achievements of the Communist Party of China and the Xi leadership.
2. Edward Luttwak’s *The Last Emperor: Xi Jinping*
Xi Jinping is widely expected to break the unwritten rules of the past and seek a third term at next year’s five-yearly Party Congress. The adoption of the “historical resolution” is aimed at solidifying his authority ahead of the Congress.
While Xi Jinping is steadily consolidating his “lifetime dictatorship,” Edward Luttwak’s *The Last Emperor: Xi Jinping* offers a sharp analysis of China’s current situation and the negotiation tactics of other countries confronting it.
(1) About Edward Luttwak

Edward Luttwak (1942–) is an American international relations scholar specializing in grand strategy, military history, and international relations.
He was born into a Jewish family in Romania and raised in Italy and England. He studied at the London School of Economics, served in the British, French, and Israeli armies, and received his PhD in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University in 1975. He is currently a Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
(2) The main points of “The Last Emperor: Xi Jinping”
① Against the Xi Jinping regime’s continued “all-out hardline diplomacy,” the best tactic for countries around the world to emulate in dealing with China is “Japanese-style negotiation.”
② By using “Japanese-style negotiation,” it is possible for a “small country (*) to create a surprise that undermines China’s prestige,” making it possible to “embarrass, stumble, and cause Xi Jinping to fall.”
(*) Here, “small countries” refers to countries that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party leadership “look down on” and “countries that (arbitrarily) assume should accept China’s demands.” Specifically, these include “the EU, Japan, India, Australia, Vietnam, and Indonesia.”
③ The “14 points of dissatisfaction” that China presented to Australia is a list of “China’s strategic weaknesses” compiled by China itself, and is an excellent example of a “stumbling block tactic” that neighboring countries intimidated by China should employ against China.
3. Contents of “The Last Emperor: Xi Jinping”
(1) A harsh experience of the Cultural Revolution
“Emperor” Xi Jinping is strengthening his authoritarian tendencies and pushing forward with a hardline diplomatic system towards other countries, known as “China 4.0” (a term coined by Edward Luttwak to describe China’s political stance towards other countries, representing a hardline diplomatic system towards various nations). He contributed to the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and as the son of Vice Premier Xi Zhongxun, he experienced the harsh realities of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution as a “child of the party.” Despite this, Xi Jinping currently urges the Chinese people to respect Mao Zedong.
(2) Xi Jinping is a “Mao Zedong Child”
Xi Jinping is moving away from the collective leadership system of a small number of top officials practiced by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and is attempting to become an “emperor” who concentrates power in his own hands and remains in that position until his death. His model is Mao Zedong. Xi Jinping aims for integration with Mao Zedong, and in a sense, he is striving to become a more perfect Mao Zedong than the actual Mao Zedong.
(3) The ethnic policy of forcing “assimilation into the Han Chinese” is even more extreme than Mao Zedong’s.
Xi Jinping is trying to completely strip away the identities of Tibetans, Mongolians, and Uyghurs and assimilate them into the Han Chinese.
Xi Jinping is sending large numbers of Han Chinese to Xinjiang, Mongolia, and other regions, attempting to turn them into Han Chinese lands. Furthermore, he is completely transforming their nomadic lifestyle and molding them into people who contribute to China’s industries. Prohibiting the education of Uyghur and Mongolian languages is tantamount to cutting off the roots of their ethnic identity. And Uyghurs whom Beijing deems refusing to comply are being sent to internment camps one after another.
This is something even Mao Zedong never did.
(4) Dictators are unsettling and dangerous.
Xi Jinping’s destructive actions are becoming more extreme as he strengthens his authoritarian regime. This is happening on two levels.
One is simply that no one can oppose Xi Jinping’s actions. Those who oppose Xi Jinping are silenced by the fear that they will either disappear or be eliminated at any moment.
Another point is that a dictatorship is actually an extremely unstable system, and dictators are inherently unstable and dangerous.
(5) Dictatorship as a Weak Power System
China has built a seemingly unshakeable power structure under the Communist Party. However, its greatest vulnerability lies in Xi Jinping’s dictatorship, particularly the constitutional amendment that allows him to remain in power until his death. In other words, if something unforeseen happens to Xi Jinping, China is currently unable to cope.
(6) Humiliate, trip, and make him fall
Xi Jinping, who has not revealed his successor, is strengthening his extreme authoritarianism. China’s increasingly hardline stance in foreign policy continues to devastate Asian international politics.
Xi Jinping is a destructive personality and extremely harmful to the world (and to China). As long as he remains in power in China, he will continue to destroy Asian international politics. Therefore, it is necessary to remove him from power.
The key is to “humiliate” Xi Jinping. Make him trip, trip, and prevent him from implementing the policies he advocates. This will create doubts about his ability to execute and judge, and deny his authority and capacity to govern. Policymakers in the United States, as well as Japan and Europe, must act with this in mind.
(7) Who will “stumble” Xi Jinping?
Currently, the United States is pursuing a policy of “countering” China. In other words, it is “maintaining the front line” against China. No matter how much the US tightens its economic grip or criticizes China on human rights issues, it will not shake the Xi Jinping regime. This is because these are attacks that Xi Jinping can prepare for. In strategy, attacking an enemy that has already prepared does not immediately lead to victory. Furthermore, the United States is a “formidable enemy that China cannot yet defeat, but will one day overcome,” and even if Xi Jinping is at a disadvantage in the current battle against the US, it does not tarnish his reputation.
So, who will carry out the task of “stumble” Xi Jinping? It will be the countries that China considers inferior: the EU, Japan, India, Australia, and others. Alternatively, we could add Vietnam and Indonesia. The counterattack from these countries, which Xi Jinping and his followers consider “small nations” and believe they should naturally accept China’s demands, is crucial in making Xi Jinping’s failures visible and spreading this message globally and within China.
(8) A Manual for “Stumbling Tactics”
In fact, other countries should simply imitate what Japan has been doing well. That is, to respond to Xi Jinping’s requests with “no.”
For example, the Senkaku Islands issue. Beijing is trying to get Japan to acknowledge that the Senkaku Islands are a disputed territory. This is intended to initiate negotiations. However, the Japanese government has consistently maintained its position that “there is nothing to negotiate.”
Xi Jinping continues to send the message to his people that “China is now a great power, and the Senkaku Islands belong to China.” However, the problem is that this has not been realized at all.
No matter how much Xi Jinping claims that “Western nations are declining and China is rising,” if the people ask, “Mr. President, that may be true, but what about our Senkaku Islands?”, he will have no answer. Furthermore, they will ask, “Why are you allowing Japan to unjustly occupy the Senkaku Islands? Why is the President such a coward?”
This also applies to the Taiwan issue. Highlighting the Taiwan issue is an effective strategy to raise the question, “When will you finally make Taiwan, which is obviously part of China, realize the truth?”
The economic sanctions imposed by India in response to the border dispute are also effective. For Chinese companies, this leads to the question, “Why should we lose hundreds of millions of dollars over such a tiny territory deep in the mountains?”
(9) “China’s Weaknesses” as Seen in 14 Points of Dissatisfaction
The Australian case is also interesting. In November 2020, the Chinese government presented a major Australian media outlet with 14 points of “grievances.” This clearly shows what irritates and dislikes China. The fact that they threatened to deliver the document with “China is angry. If you treat China as an enemy, China will become your enemy” speaks volumes.
The main points of the 14 points are as follows:
● Chinese investment in infrastructure, agriculture, and livestock is restricted for “national security” reasons.
● For similar reasons, Huawei and ZTE were excluded from the next-generation 5G network.
● The Foreign Interference Act, which criminalizes “harmful and covert actions by foreigners attempting to interfere with Australia’s democratic processes,” unjustly targets China.
● Exchanges and cooperation between China and Australia are treated politically, and restrictions such as visa revocations for Chinese scholars are imposed.
* Calls for an independent international investigation into COVID-19 are an attack on China.
* China is at the forefront of repression against China, constantly interfering forcefully in its Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan issues.
* Despite not being a coastal state, it drafted a statement for submission to the UN regarding the South China Sea issue.
* China is participating in the US anti-China campaign and deliberately spreading misinformation against China’s efforts to contain COVID-19.
* Legislation targeting China has compelled scrutiny of agreements with foreign governments (referring to Victoria’s withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative).
* China has funded the government-affiliated think tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (which reported on forced labor in Xinjiang), and spread false reports aimed at manipulating public opinion against China.
* House searches and property confiscations of Chinese journalists (investigations on suspicion of espionage).
* Suspicions against China regarding cyberattacks.
* Condemnation of the Chinese Communist Party by members of parliament and racist attacks.
● Unfriendly or hostile reporting on China that harms bilateral relations.
In other words, this can be considered a list of “China’s strategic weaknesses”—areas the Chinese government itself created to avoid being attacked. Furthermore, these 14 items serve as a perfect example and manual of “stumbling block tactics” that neighboring countries, feeling intimidated by China, should employ against China.
(10) Stumbling Blocks Regarding the Investment Agreement with the EU
Another recent example is the developments surrounding the investment agreement with the EU. In December 2020, the European Commission announced that it had reached a principle agreement with China on a Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CAI) aimed at improving the investment environment, including market opening and ensuring fair competition. This was strongly requested by German industry and others who wanted to invest more in China, but when the contents of the agreement were actually revealed, it became clear that China had not significantly loosened its regulations. In other words, it did not offer the expected benefits. Nevertheless, China was pushing ahead with ratification of the agreement, ignoring the US demands for a postponement of the signing.
However, in January 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution questioning the agreement, criticizing the EU’s failure to take concrete action against serious human rights abuses in China, such as forced labor in Xinjiang and the Hong Kong National Security Law, stating that it “could undermine the credibility of the EU, which values human rights.” Furthermore, in March, the EU, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada imposed sanctions on Chinese officials responsible for governing the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, as well as on paramilitary organizations stationed in Xinjiang and the Public Security Bureau of the Production and Construction Corps, for human rights abuses and forced labor against the Uyghur people. Such actions by the EU were unprecedented since the Tiananmen Square incident.
In response, China imposed retaliatory sanctions, banning European Parliament members from entering China. In May, the European Parliament passed a resolution stating that it would not consider the agreement at all unless the retaliatory sanctions were lifted.
(11) Leaks from within the Communist Party and backlash from Eastern European countries
When Xi Jinping intensified his ethnic repression in Xinjiang, a large number of classified documents concerning the Uyghurs were leaked to Western media, making the reality of the situation widely known outside of China. This means that there are local Communist Party officials who perceive Xi Jinping as a dangerous fanatic. This was their resistance to Xi Jinping, exposing the fact that his governance of Xinjiang was not working well.
Similarly, if the European Parliament were to reject the investment agreement with Beijing, it would be like a slap in the face for Xi Jinping. The collapse of an investment agreement that Xi Jinping had widely presented to the world as a “great success” would be a failure for him, and he would lose face. This is what it means to “make Xi Jinping stumble.”
In Europe, the Baltic states and Eastern European countries are also showing signs of actions that are irritating Xi Jinping. Slovenia, Croatia, and the Czech Republic have suspended government tenders for infrastructure projects, including nuclear power plants, highways, and railway networks, that involved Chinese companies. Romania and Lithuania have excluded Chinese companies from government procurement across a wide range of sectors.
(12) Surprises from Small Countries that Hurt China
Furthermore, since 2012, China has called upon 16 former communist countries to form a group known as “16+1” (plus 1, of course, being China). However, at a virtual meeting hosted by Xi Jinping in February 2021, which included Greece and was called “17+1,” while China demanded the participation of each country’s prime minister, six countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia—deliberately sent lower-ranking ministers instead. A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry commented that the meeting was “successfully held with the leaders,” but in May, Lithuania announced its withdrawal from the group.
The key point here is that this strategy is effective when countries that China considers “small nations” surprise China by rejecting or refusing proposals or projects that China has already touted as successful, thereby “losing face.”
Japan and Vietnam can do this. South Korea could potentially do it as well, but after the Lotte Group, which provided the land for the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system, was expelled from China, they are no longer able to resist China. They are essentially China’s “loyal dogs.”
Surprisingly, Indonesia is making good moves. Following repeated incursions of Chinese Coast Guard vessels into its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in recent years, Indonesia decided in 2020 to deploy a rapid response force consisting of Apache helicopters and other aircraft.
Here again, the “alliance strategy” is effective. These “small nations” in China’s eyes are using “stumbling block tactics” to increasingly destabilize Xi Jinping’s authoritarian regime.
(13) The “Smile Tactic” is merely superficial.
As various historical lessons have shown, Xi Jinping’s authoritarian regime will inevitably collapse. And Xi Jinping will become the “Last Emperor.” The problem is, we don’t know if this will happen in 5 years, 8 years, 50 years, or 80 years.
Paradoxically, if the “alliance strategy” and “stumbling tactics” prove highly effective, China might abandon “China 4.0” (a term coined by Edward Luttwak to describe China’s political stance towards other countries, representing a hardline diplomatic system), abandon its ambitions in the South China Sea, and adopt a milder, more cooperative “China 5.0.” In that case, the Xi dynasty would be prolonged. However, considering Xi Jinping’s character and China’s strategic incompetence, the possibility of such a policy shift favorable to China is still extremely low.
In May 2021, Xi Jinping stated, “Create an image of China that is humble, trustworthy, loved, and respected.” Some reports suggested this represented a shift away from “wolf warrior diplomacy” (*), but this is not the case. This was merely a “smile tactic” for image purposes, and the hardline stance remains. This is evident from the fact that the “Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law,” which retaliates against foreign sanctions, was passed and immediately implemented at the National People’s Congress the following June.
(*) About “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy”
China once maintained the “韜光养晦” (taoguang yanghui) policy attributed to Deng Xiaoping (meaning to conceal and accumulate one’s strength, and to refrain from conflict with foreign countries until development was achieved). However, this stance has changed with economic development, and Xi Jinping’s recent stance has become extremely hardline, an aggressive diplomatic style sometimes called “wolf warrior diplomacy.”
4. My Personal Impressions
Certainly, Chinese spokespeople often express dissatisfaction (or intimidation?) with phrases like “We resolutely oppose any act that interferes in China’s internal affairs” or “We will not tolerate any act that harms China’s interests.” I believe this is a manifestation of China’s frustration at being hit where it hurts.
I believe that China’s provocative actions, such as incursions into territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, will continue until a Taiwan contingency (a direct attack on Taiwan by China, or the landing and occupation of Taiwan by Chinese troops) becomes a reality. Furthermore, I believe that the illegal occupation of the Senkaku Islands will be unavoidable after such a contingency.
A “containment network against China,” similar to the “ABCD encirclement” against Japan during World War II, is gradually forming, but I don’t know how it will unfold.
However, I think simply saying “no” to Xi Jinping’s requests, as Edward Luttwak suggests, will have limited effect.
I believe it is essential to urgently reduce our dependence on China. I wrote about this in detail in a previous article titled “Now is the time to bring manufacturing (factories) back to Japan and break away from China’s dependence on supply chains.”
Also, as I wrote in the article “What is Economic Security? This is Economic Warfare and Japan’s Urgent Issue Today!”, we must remember that we are already in a state of intense economic warfare.
Ultimately, it could lead to a “Third World War,” a coup d’état within China to overthrow the Xi Jinping regime, a popular uprising fueled by discontent over the extreme wealth inequality seen in the extramarital lifestyles of top Chinese Communist Party officials and the wealthy who profited from the “real estate bubble,” or even a democratic revolution similar to the French Revolution.
At the very least, I believe the only way to overthrow the Xi Jinping regime is not through “military attack” by foreign powers or the establishment of a “puppet regime,” but through “internal collapse” brought about by the actions of the Chinese people themselves.